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Divorce Reform in Egypt and Morocco: Men and 





This essay focuses on recent divorce reforms in Egypt (2000) and Morocco (2004), with 
equal attention to the positions of men and women who end their marriages. Whereas 
in Egypt, non-consensual, no-fault divorce reform (khul‘) is open only to women, in 
Morocco, another form of non-consensual, no-fault divorce, shiqāq, is open to both 
women and men, with men using it almost as frequently as women. Based on legal 
analysis and anthropological fieldwork, I consider first how men and women navigate 
rights and duties in divorce and then examine the differences between the two coun-
tries in the way men and women try to obtain divorce. I conclude that when both men 
and women are given opportunities for non-consensual, no fault divorce, highly gender-
specific divorce regimes, such as the ṭalāq and taṭlīq, quickly lose their popularity.
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 Introduction
The reform of codified divorce law has developed in stages throughout most of 
the Muslim world. During the first stage, legislators and ruling elites intro-
duced procedural constraints that limited a husband’s right to a non-consen-
sual and no-fault divorce through ṭalāq.1 Simultaneously, the grounds on which 
a woman may initiate a fault-based divorce (taṭlīq) were expanded, mostly in 
countries where the Hanafi law school is dominant (Welchman 2007: 109; Kru-
iniger 2015: 87). In Egypt, for example, a repudiation pronounced by a husband 
who is intoxicated or under duress was declared ineffective in 1929 (Article 1 of 
Personal Status Law no. 25/ 1929). Additionally, the triple ṭalāq, in which the 
husband utters the repudiation three times in one sitting, counted, and still 
counts, as only one (ibid.: Article 3). Before the initial codification of Personal 
Status Law (hereinafter PSL) in 1920, Egyptian Muslim women could only re-
quest a non-consensual divorce on the grounds allowed by the Hanafi law 
school, i.e., the husband’s impotence, prolonged absence (i.e. if 90 years have 
elapsed since his birth), or apostasy. The PSLs of 1920 and 1929 gave women 
several new grounds for divorce. These were, and still are, the husband’s ab-
sence without legitimate cause for a period exceeding one year (Article 12 of 
PSL no. 25/1929); his imprisonment for a period exceeding three years (Article 
14 of PSL no. 25/1929); his mental illness or grave and incurable sickness, about 
which the wife had no knowledge at the time of the marriage (Article 9 of PSL 
no. 25/1929);2 his failure to provide maintenance; or his harming of his wife 
(Article 6 of PSL no. 25/1929; amended by PSL no. 100/ 1985).
Morocco’s first codification of PSL in 1957-1958 resulted in similar restric-
tions on a husband’s right to ṭalāq. A repudiation pronounced during men-
struation, extreme anger, or linked to an oath or conditions is ineffective. As in 
Egypt, threefold-repudiations count as one (Buskens 2003: 74). Like their Egyp-
tian counterparts, Moroccan women were given a number of grounds for di-
vorce. This is not surprising because the Maliki law school, which is officially 
adopted in Morocco, is liberal in granting women judicial divorce as compared 
to the other three Sunni law schools. Maliki law has served as a basis for reform 
in many other Muslim-majority countries, including Egypt.
The Egyptian and Moroccan divorce reforms resemble reforms introduced 
by legislators and ruling elites in many other Muslim-majority countries, where 
the prevailing Sunni understanding of ṭalāq and taṭlīq was incorporated into 
1 In this essay, ‘no-fault’ refers to a divorce in which fault is not a requirement to obtain the 
divorce. 
2 Grave and incurable sickness does not include impotence, but the 1929 PSL states that the 
Hanafi doctrine applies in cases not covered by the 1929 PSL. For this reason, judges continued 
to issue divorces on the basis of impotence (Shaham 1997: 114).
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national laws.3 There have been a few exceptions to this pattern. In Turkey, 
sharī‘a-based family law was replaced in 1926 by the Swiss Civil Code of 1907, 
including its law of personal status (Ansay and Wallace, Jr. 2005: 9). Following 
Tunisia’s independence from France in 1956, President Habib Bourguiba intro-
duced a law of personal status that gave men and women equal divorce rights. 
In Indonesia, the Marriage Law of 1974 – applicable to Muslims and non-Mus-
lims – introduced, first, judicial divorce for men and women, and, second, the 
same divorce grounds for men and women, including irreconcilable marital 
discord (shiqāq). Likewise, in Pakistan in 1967, the Supreme Court endorsed a 
new understanding of khul‘ as a non-consensual divorce on the demand of the 
wife (Khurshid Bibi v. Muhammad Amin, PLD 1967 SC 97).
In Islamic law, khul` is technically a divorce by the husband in return for 
compensation paid to him by the wife. According to Hanafi doctrine, a man or 
a woman may initiate a khul‘ divorce (Zantout 2006: 4). However, in Pakistan 
and elsewhere, more women do so than men, usually in return for (financial) 
compensation, to which the husband must consent. The 1967 Pakistani ruling 
was pioneering in that, first, the husband’s consent was no longer a legal pre-
requisite, and, second, a woman did not need to show cause in court. While 
this ruling considerably improved the legal position of women inside Pakistan, 
it received little attention outside the country, despite the fact that the reform 
placed Pakistan at the forefront of what Welchman calls a “third phase” of di-
vorce reform in Arab countries. In this third phase, legislators tried to temper a 
husband’s power of ṭalāq by introducing non-consensual, no-fault divorce 
(2007: 109). In Arab countries, this phase started in Egypt in January 2000 with 
the introduction of a divorce procedure for women called khul‘. This form of 
khul‘ did not require the consent of the husband, neither did it require the wife 
to show cause in court.
The introduction of khul‘ provoked heated debates both inside and outside 
Egypt (Sonneveld 2012: Chapters 2 and 3). Other Arab states followed the Egyp-
tian example by introducing similar laws, including Jordan in 2001 (Welchman 
2007: 116) and, to different degrees, Algeria (2005), Palestine (2005), Qatar 
(2006), and the United Arab Emirates (2005) (ibid.: 119). In Morocco, Benyahya, 
cited in Welchman (2007: 120), found that women’s rights organisations also 
requested the inclusion of non-consensual khul‘ divorce. The Moroccan legis-
lature declined this request but gave women the right to a new form of non-
consensual, no-fault divorce through a procedure called shiqāq. In Morocco, 
shiqāq refers to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences; such a divorce 
may be initiated by either spouse. If two court-appointed arbitrators are 
3 A few examples are: Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Pakistan, and Sudan. For details, see Welchman 
(2007). 
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unable to reconcile the spouses, the court will grant the divorce (Articles 94-97 
Family Law 2004, hereafter FL 2004).4
Along with rights come obligations. Typically, ṭalāq entails not only a hus-
band’s right to dissolve the marital union on a no-fault basis and without the 
consent of his wife, but also his duty to pay the deferred dower, waiting-period 
maintenance, and sometimes also mut‘a (compensation that the wife receives 
if the judge does not hold her responsible for the divorce).5 Similarly, khul‘ and 
shiqāq encompass not only a wife’s right to demand a no-fault and non-con-
sensual divorce but also her duty to relinquish (some) outstanding debts that 
her husband owes her and, in Egypt, to compensate her husband by returning 
the ṣadāq (dower) to him. A Moroccan woman compensates her husband if he 
requests it and is able to prove that she is responsible for the marital discord.
In this essay, I focus on Egypt and Morocco, the two Muslim-majority coun-
tries that arguably introduced the most extensive divorce reforms of the 2000s. 
My goal is to gain a better understanding of both women’s and men’s rights and 
duties with respect to divorce. I pose the following questions: first, how do men 
and women navigate rights and duties in divorce? Second, are there differenc-
es between the two countries regarding the way men and women try to obtain 
divorce? The following analysis is based on qualitative research methods, in 
different time periods, and I therefore do not draw any general conclusions.
This essay is based on data gathered through formal and informal meetings 
with judges (male and female) and litigants (male and female), in addition to 
the analysis of legal documents in Egypt (2003-2005) and Morocco (2014-2015). 
In Egypt, I interviewed fifteen family law judges (all male) in five courthouses 
in Cairo. In Morocco, I interviewed 61 family law judges (25 women and 36 
men) in nine courthouses across the country.
The part of my research project dealing with litigants was based on informal 
meetings and discussions, fleeting comments, observations, and chance en-
counters with Egyptians and Moroccans from all walks of life. In Egypt, I spoke 
to more than 100 women who were involved in divorce (mostly khul‘) cases as 
litigants, lawyers, or mediators. Sixteen of these meetings were recorded and 
conducted in a formal and structured manner, while the others were informal 
and loosely structured meetings. Likewise, most meetings in Morocco with 
women litigants were informal. Fifty-three women with marital problems were 
interviewed in a formal and structured manner, either inside or in front of the 
4 Al-nizā‘ wa-l-shiqāq as a ground for arbitration that may lead to separation of the spouses 
appeared already in the 1917 Ottoman Family Rights Law. 
5 If there are children, a husband must also pay maintenance for them and, in some countries, 
provide the children and their mother with adequate housing. See Welchman (2007: 130-31).
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courthouse. In both countries, I spoke with numerous men involved in divorce 
cases, either as husbands, family members, or lawyers. As with the women, 
most data were gathered informally. The presence of my husband considerably 
facilitated access to men. In his presence, I could meet with men without rais-
ing any suspicion and at the same time hear these men argue about marriage 
and divorce in general. The subject of marriage and divorce often aroused 
strong emotions, as many of these men were either preparing for marriage or 
dealing with a difficult or failed marriage. The meetings with men in Egypt 
were all informal, while in Morocco my research assistants conducted struc-
tured interviews with twenty-five men, either inside or in front of the court-
house.
I also analysed Egyptian and Moroccan legal documents, such as the family 
law codes, court records, case law, official documents that explain the spirit of 
the law, and the annotations of legal professionals. These documents are writ-
ten in Arabic or in French.
Sections one and two of this essay present an overview of legal regulations 
dealing with divorce in Egypt and Morocco, respectively. In contrast to most 
other studies, this essay focuses not only on rights, but also on obligations per-
taining to both men and women. Section three demonstrates how legal rules 
are applied in Egyptian and Moroccan courts. Using this data, I respond to the 
two main questions that are central to this essay.
1 Possibilities for Divorce in Egypt
Prior to the introduction of non-consensual khul‘ in 2000, Egyptian legal prac-
tice recognised three forms of dissolution.6 No-fault dissolution at the demand 
of a husband (ṭalāq) and wife-initiated judicial divorce on the basis of vari-
ous legally stipulated grounds (ṭatlīq) were both covered by codified Personal 
Status Law. Divorce by agreement was not codified and when litigants sought 
to formally register such a divorce, judges invoked Hanafi doctrine or the un-
official Qadri Basha Code.7 Divorce by agreement took two forms: delegated 
repudiation, in which a husband delegates the right of repudiation to his wife,8 
6 The death or conversion of one of the spouses also leads to the dissolution and nullity, respec-
tively, of marriage.
7 Published in 1875 by the Egyptian government, the Qadri Basha Code was a compilation of 
Hanafi doctrine in personal status matters (Shaham 1997: 14). It never gained official approval 
but was and is widely used by Egyptian judges. 
8 Egyptian lawyers and judges call this procedure ‘iṣma. In cases of ‘iṣma, a wife registers the 
right to delegated repudiation in the marriage contract.
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and divorce by mutual consent through khul‘.9 While delegated repudiation 
was rarely used, consensual khul‘ was a favourite means of divorce for women, 
as was the case in medieval Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem (Rapoport 2005), 
Ottoman Egypt (Sonbol 1995), Istanbul (Zilfi 1997), Rumelia (present south-
eastern Europe) (Ivanova 1996), and Marinid Morocco (mid-thirteenth-mid-
fifteenth century) (Admiral 2016: 21).10 In a study of decisions by the Egyptian 
sharī‘a courts between 1900 and 1955, Shaham found that fault-based divorces 
were rare, whereas divorces by mutual agreement were common (Shaham 
1997: 106-07, 118-19).11
 Men’s Divorce in Egypt: Rights and Duties
Until the present, a Muslim husband in Egypt may pronounce the repudiation 
outside of court and needs only to register it with the ma’dhūn (registrar) with-
in thirty days of the date of pronunciation (Article 5 bis of PSL no. 100/1985).12 
Non-registration of the repudiation does not render it invalid. A husband who 
repudiates his wife must compensate her by paying the deferred dower, wait-
ing-period maintenance, and sometimes also mut‘a. If there are children, a 
husband must also pay maintenance for them and provide the children and 
their mother with adequate housing. Since 2000, failure to pay maintenance 
may result in imprisonment for a period not to exceed thirty days (Article 76 
bis of Law no. 91 of 2000) (Bernard-Maugiron 2004: 376). Since 1920, the codifi-
cation of Personal Status Law in Egypt has given women more opportunities 
for non-consensual, fault-based divorce (ṭatlīq) (in the 1920s and 1980s), and 
for non-consensual, no-fault based divorce (khul‘) (in 2000). By contrast, op-
tions for divorce for Egyptian Muslim men have not increased, and are cur-
rently limited to ṭalāq, a non-consensual, no-fault based divorce in which they 
must pay their wives the deferred dower, waiting-period maintenance, and, in 
some cases, a mut‘a compensation, regardless of who was responsible for the 
marital breakup. Egyptian Muslim men do not have access to fault-based judi-
cial divorce (El-Ehwany 2012: 55).
 Women’s Divorce in Egypt: Rights and Duties
As noted, since the codification of PSL in the 1920s, a woman has several 
grounds for a fault-based divorce in which she retains her financial rights, i.e., 
9 The Qadri Basha Code deals with delegated repudiation (‘iṣma) in Articles 260-65 and 
with khul‘ in Articles 273-97 (Ebert 2010: 92-3, 96-102).
10 On the historical origins and practice of khul‘ in the Muslim world, see Sonneveld and 
Stiles (2016). 
11 Only approximately 70 of the thousands of cases that Shaham studied were fault-based 
divorce cases.
12 “Bis” means two and refers to the inclusion of a new paragraph in an already existing law 
article. This is usually done to avoid renumbering the entire law.
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the deferred dower, waiting-period maintenance and, after 1979, mut‘a com-
pensation. However, it is difficult for a woman to establish grounds for fault-
based divorce. Until the promulgation of PSL no. 1/2000, unless she was unable 
to convince her husband to agree to a khul‘ by mutual consent, she had no 
choice but to remain in an unwanted marriage, as exemplified in the influen-
tial 1975 Egyptian film “Urīdu Ḥallan” (I Want a Solution), which was set during 
the administration of Egypt’s second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Notably, Nasser’s socialist regime expanded women’s rights in education 
and employment and gave women the right to vote in 1956. Changes in wom-
en’s public rights were not accompanied by legal reform in the private sphere, 
however. For reasons that require further research, Nasser hesitated to reform 
the PSL.13 As a result, a husband was legally obligated to provide financial sup-
port for his wife, and his wife was obligated to obey him. This meant that a wife 
could not leave the house without her husband’s permission, even if she was a 
minister in the government. Similarly, if a woman wanted a divorce, she was 
dependent on the consent of either her husband or a male judge (Egypt’s first 
female judge was appointed in 2003. See Sonneveld and Tawfik 2015).
“Urīdu Ḥallan” tells the story of an upper-class Egyptian woman in a dys-
functional marriage who asks her husband to pronounce a ṭalāq. As a profes-
sional with her own source of income, she does not want to claim any of her 
outstanding financial rights. When her husband refuses, she has no choice but 
to file a fault-based divorce on the ground of harm. After a four-year legal bat-
tle, the judges deny her request because, they argue, she did not present clear 
and convincing evidence of harm by her husband. Throughout the film, she 
searches for a solution in the form of khul‘: non-consensual, no-fault divorce 
upon the demand of the wife. She claims that Muslim women have this right 
based on a ḥadīth in which a married woman approaches the Prophet, telling 
him that she cannot stand living with her husband, even though he is a reli-
gious man of good character. She fears that she will transgress the limits of God 
if she stays in this marriage. The Prophet asks her if she is willing to give up the 
garden that was her dower. She agrees, whereupon he orders the husband to 
pronounce the ṭalāq.
The film had a great impact on Egyptian society and inspired women’s rights 
activists to demand reform of PSL. These activisists played an important role in 
13 Elsewhere I have argued that Egypt’s defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, which was fol-
lowed by an increase in religiousity and the growing popularity of the Muslim Brother-
hood, made it difficult for Nasser to introduce reform of PSL (Sonneveld 2012: 23-4). 
Sezgin (2013: 172) argues that Nasser did not regard the reform of substantive PSL as im-
portant. However, a recent documentary establishes that Tunisian president Habib Bour-
guiba and Nasser met in Tunis in 1966, a year prior to the war. When Bourguiba asked 
Nasser what was preventing him from introducing PSL reforms similar to the Tunisian 
reforms, Nasser replied: “I can’t” (Feminists Insha’allah 2014).
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helping draft a law for personal status reform, which then President Anwar 
Sadat introduced in 1979, during a parliamentary recess. This reform (cancelled 
in 1985 and replaced by PSL no. 100/1985) allows a woman to ask the court for 
divorce on the ground of shiqāq (marital discord), even when arbitrators have 
concluded that she bears more responsibility for the discord then he does. She 
must, however, persist in her claim and persuade the judge that marital life has 
become impossible (Article 11 of PSL no. 100/1985) (Shaham 1997: 117). In the 
late 1990s, a group of seven women (“The Group of Seven”), successfully lob-
bied high-ranking figures in the Ministry of Justice and al-Azhar to redefine 
khul‘ as the right of a Muslim woman to non-consensual, no-fault divorce (see 
Shaham 1999; Singerman 2005). Their efforts provoked much public debate, 
but in January 2000 a new procedural law on personal status was accepted by 
Parliament (Law no. 1/ 2000). This law includes a few substantive provisions, 
such as a woman’s right to khul‘ divorce without the consent of her husband. 
The inclusion of non-consensual khul‘ divorce in the new PSL provoked much 
controversy in Egyptian society. Indeed, the law itself became known as 
“the khul‘ law.” The legislature claimed that the law was consistent with the 
principles of Islam, as confirmed by the Sheikh of al-Azhar. But opponents 
claimed that non-consensual khul‘ was an assault on religion –indeed, a West-
ern invention introduced by the wife of the president in order to destabilise 
Egyptian family life. Opponents also argued that women were too emotional to 
be given the right to non-consensual, no-fault divorce and that they would use 
it for frivolous reasons, such as to marry another man (e.g. Sonneveld 2012: 
Chapter 2).
A closer look at the relevant khul‘ provision (Article 20) reveals that it in-
cludes two different forms of khul‘, one consensual (“The spouses may mutu-
ally agree to khul‘ …”) and one initiated by the wife (“however, if they do not 
agree and the wife sues demanding it, and separates herself from her husband 
by giving up all her financial legal rights, and restores to him the ṣadāq (dower) 
he gave to her, then the court is to divorce her from him …”). The right to non-
consensual, no-fault divorce is accompanied by certain obligations. A woman 
who requests a khul‘ divorce has the legal obligation to relinquish the out-
standing financial rights (deferred dower, waiting-period maintenance, and 
mut‘a compensation) to which she normally would be entitled in a ṭalāq di-
vorce. The law also specifies that she must return the “ṣadāq” (dower). Not-
withstanding these financial consequences, khul‘ soon became very popular 
and within a year it was more often requested than the different forms of fault-
based divorce, at least in Cairo and in courthouses north of Cairo (Sulīmān and 
Ṣalāḥ 2003: 18-28). This development did not go unnoticed in neighbouring 
countries, such as Jordan and Palestine, and in countries on the periphery of 
the Arabic-speaking world, notably Morocco and Algeria, where non-consen-
sual, no-fault divorce was introduced in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
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2 Possibilities for Divorce in Morocco
One year after Morocco gained its independence from France in 1956, King 
Muhammad V codified personal status matters. The law adhered closely to Ma-
liki doctrine. It was reformed for the first time in 1993 under King Hassan II, 
but the changes in women’s divorce rights were minor (e.g. Buskens 2003; al-
Akhrīsī 2005; Ghamīja 2007). Hence, prior to the February 2004 reform, the le-
gal right of a Moroccan woman to marry and divorce had remained almost 
unchanged for half a century. While a man could marry and divorce without 
the participation of a guardian (wālī), a woman needed the consent of her 
marriage guardian to marry14 and the consent of her husband or a judge to di-
vorce.
As in Egypt, there were three forms of divorce in Morocco prior to 2004:15 at 
the demand of the husband (ṭalāq); on the initiative of the wife (ṭatlīq); and by 
mutual agreement. In contrast to Egypt, divorce by mutual agreement was 
codified and it could take the form of either tamlīk or khul‘. Under tamlīk, a 
husband delegates the right of repudiation to his wife (Articles 44 and 67 PSL 
1993; Article 89 FL 2004) – as in Egypt, this is rare in practice (Jordens-Cotran 
2007: 327). Under khul‘, a public notary (‘adl, pl. ‘udūl) is responsible for issuing 
the khul‘ divorce certificate, and the presence of the wife is mandatory (Jor-
dens-Cotran 2007: 350).
There are only a few historical studies dealing with the ways in which men 
and women made use of Islamic law in Morocco. Most studies center on the 
Middle East, and especially Islamic law under the Ottoman Empire, with the 
exception of Admiral’s recent study on women’s engagement with Islamic law 
under the Marinid dynasty (mid-thirteenth –mid-fifteenth century). In the 
area of divorce, Admiral shows that men went to court when there was confu-
sion about the effects of the ṭalāq pronouncement (Admiral 2016: 120-22). 
Women had access to fault-based divorce but it was difficult to establish 
grounds for such a divorce, such as ḍarar (harm). Consequently, women di-
vorced through khul‘, which, in Marinid Morocco, required the consent of the 
husband. After they had secured divorce through khul‘, women would attempt 
to establish the grounds of harm retroactively in order to recover that part of 
14  In the 1993 reform of the Moroccan PSL, the only exception to the rule that a woman 
needs the consent of her marriage guardian to marry and of her husband or a judge to 
divorce is a female orphan who has reached the legal age of majority (Jordens-Cotran 
2007: 139).
15 As in Egypt, the death or conversion of one of the spouses also leads to the dissolution 
and nullity, respectively, of marriage.
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the dower (usually the deferred dower) that they had given up in the khul‘ 
(Admiral 2016: 127-28).
 Men’s Divorce in Morocco: Rights and Duties
Although scholars frequently claim that the changes brought about by the 1993 
PSL reform were small and symbolic (e.g. Buskens 2003; al-Akhrīsī 2005; Gha-
mīja 2007), the right of a husband to divorce through ṭalāq was curtailed (Krui-
niger 2015: 179). Apart from the fact that the 1993 PSL made it obligatory for a 
husband to ask a judge for permission to repudiate his wife, a wife was notified 
and summoned to appear in court and to provide information in order to allow 
the judge to establish post-divorce provisions. In ṭalāq divorces, the 1993 PSL 
also required the spouses to undergo mediation, and a judge would not issue 
the divorce certificate until the husband had paid a mandatory deposit at the 
court to be used to maintain his ex-wife and children following the divorce 
(Jordens-Cotran 2007: 310).
The ṭalāq regulations included in the 2004 legislation are even more ex-
tensive than those in the 1993 PSL. For example, whereas prior to 2004 a hus-
band had to pay the mandatory deposit at the court within a period, which, 
however, was not specified, after the 2004 reform he must pay the deposit 
 within thirty days after the date on which mediation attempts failed; non-pay-
ment is considered a renunciation of his intention to repudiate (e.g. Kruiniger 
2015: 179-80).
In the context of tightening legal regulations on ṭalāq, the 2004 PSL reform 
simultaneously offers men a new way to divorce their wives on a non-consen-
sual, no-fault basis. Through a procedure called taṭlīq li’l- shiqāq, a man may 
request dissolution of the marital bond on the basis of marital discord (shiqāq), 
which he does not need to establish, but merely state in court. Like ṭalāq, 
shiqāq requires the couple to undergo mediation. Whereas ṭalāq is revocable, 
a shiqāq divorce is irrevocable, which means that the wife becomes unavail-
able to her former husband unless they remarry and he pays her a new dower.16 
Initially, a husband in a shiqāq divorce was not required to place the manda-
tory deposit at the court within thirty days from the date on which the medita-
tion attempts failed. As will be explained below, this practice changed a few 
years later.
16 Although shiqāq in Morocco is irrevocable, a former wife does not need to consummate 
an intermediate marriage with another man (taḥlīl) unless her husband has divorced her 
for a third time through shiqāq.
Downloaded from Brill.com12/21/2018 10:15:19AM
via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
 159Divorce Reform In Egypt And Morocco
Islamic Law and Society 26 (2019) 149-178
 Women’s Divorce in Morocco: Rights and Duties
Before 2004, a Moroccan woman was entitled to a divorce without relinquish-
ing her financial rights if she could prove one of several legally stipulated 
grounds, such as non-payment of maintenance by the husband, harm (physi-
cal and/or mental), and/or absence of the husband. As in other Muslim-major-
ity countries, these grounds were difficult to establish in practice. In a study of 
judicial practice in two courts in Rabat and Salé, Mir-Hosseini notes that in the 
late 1980s, taṭlīq divorces comprised less than 3 percent of all divorce requests 
made by men and women (Mir-Hosseini 2000: 150). In 1987, more than one-
third of all divorce requests in Rabat and Salé involved khul‘ by agreement 
(2000: 151). In such cases, the wife usually forfeited the right to maintenance for 
her children, despite the fact that such a concession was explicitly forbidden 
by article 60 of the PSL of 1993 (ibid.). A khul‘ agreement, however, was and still 
is conditional on the consent of the husband. Before 2004, if he refused, for 
whatever reason, to pronounce the ṭalāq, and she could not show cause in 
court, the wife had no other choice but to remain in an unwanted marriage.
After 2000, Moroccan women’s rights organisations asked the legislature to 
make the Egyptian understanding of khul‘ as a non-consensual, no-fault di-
vorce available to Moroccan women. As mentioned, the Moroccan legislature 
declined this request (Welchman 2007: 120). Nevertheless, the FL 2004 articles 
that address khul‘ are almost identical to the Egyptian article on khul‘. The first 
article (Article 115) states: “The spouses may mutually agree to khul‘”, and Arti-
cle 120 states: “… when the wife persists in her khul‘ request, and the husband 
does not consent, the wife may invoke the shiqāq procedure.” Since a Moroc-
can woman already has access to shiqāq, the inclusion of articles 115 and 120 is 
merely symbolic. According to Jordens-Cotran, the Moroccan legislature want-
ed to preserve consensual khul‘ in order to appease conservative opposition to 
the new law (2007: 338). Given that the Egyptian family law reforms of the 
1920s had served as a source of inspiration for Moroccan PSL reform in the late 
1950s (Ghamīja 2007: 25),17 it is not unlikely that in the early 2000s, the Moroc-
can legislature, inspired by the Egyptian khul‘ reform, redefined shiqāq (mari-
tal discord). Under the 1993 PSL, women in shiqāq procedures had to establish 
that marital discord resulted in harm (ḍarar) (Buskens 1999: 156). After the in-
troduction of the 2004 legislation, they no longer needed to do so and it was 
sufficient to establish marital discord.
17 Both the Egyptian PSL reforms of the 1920s and the Syrian PSL of 1953 were a source of 
inspiration for the drafters of the Moroccan PSL of 1957-1958. This did not apply to the 
Tunisian PSL, despite the fact that it was issued shortly before the Moroccan PSL (Ghamīja 
2007: 25).
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There are important similarities between Egyptian khul‘ and Moroccan 
shiqāq. Both require that the spouses appear in court for mediation sessions. 
Both end the marital relationship in an irrevocable manner within a predeter-
mined period, not to exceed three months in Egypt18 and six months in Mo-
rocco. There are also important differences. While the Egyptian khul‘ is clearly 
reserved for a wife, shiqāq may be requested by either a wife or a husband. 
Whereas Egyptian women in khul‘ cases must relinquish their outstanding fi-
nancial rights and return the dower, Moroccan women in shiqāq cases “only” 
relinquish their right to mut‘a, and only if they initiate the divorce. According 
to the legal professionals with whom I spoke, a woman does not pay her hus-
band a compensation unless he requests it and is able to prove that she con-
tributed to the marital discord. But whereas the legal professionals I interviewed 
claimed that this rarely happens, Kruiniger (2015: 190-91) and Loukili (2017: 78) 
suggest that judges frequently award compensation (indemnité ) to husbands 
who demand it, although they do not make clear how frequently this happens.19 
Additional research is needed to establish how frequently wives have to pay 
compensation to their husbands. At this point, it is important to bear in mind 
that whereas in Egyptian khul‘ cases compensation is automatic, in Moroccan 
shiqāq cases it is not (Jordens-Cotran 2007: 349). The differences between 
Egypt and Morocco led Loukili and Zirari-Devif to conclude that the no-fault 
divorce rights of Moroccan women are more advantageous than those avail-
able to Egyptian women (2004-2005).
 Divorce by Agreement
The 2004 FL also includes a provision that resembles the Moroccan khul‘ (by 
agreement) provision. This provision allows men and women to apply for di-
vorce by mutual consent through a procedure called al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq. Unlike 
khul‘, however, in al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq the spouses set the terms and conditions 
for the divorce themselves, without the involvement of the court, as long as 
“the interests of children are not harmed” (Article 114 FL 2004).20 According to 
a woman judge who specialises in al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq cases, this means that the 
18 The Egyptian provision on khul‘ mentions that attempts at reconciliation should not ex-
ceed three months, without placing any time limit on the entirety of the khul‘ procedure 
(Article 20 of Law no. 1/2000). The Moroccan provision on shiqāq is more explicit, stating 
that “the case should be settled in a period not exceeding six months from the date the 
petition was filed” (Article 97 FL 2004).
19 For two examples of case law, see Loukili and Zirari (2017: 535-37).
20 The Moroccan al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq resembles what is often called mubārāʾa, which can be 
initiated by either party and usually requires the wife to renounce her outstanding finan-
cial rights rather than pay her husband compensation (Welchman 2007: 112). 
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spouses are free to decide whether or not one should pay the other financial 
compensation. The terms and conditions of the agreement are recorded in 
writing, either by the spouses at home or in the office of the kātib al-‘umūmī 
(public clerk), and submitted to the judge. The spouses also must appear in 
court for mediation.21
The introduction of shiqāq and al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq expanded opportunities 
for divorce for both women and men in Morocco. Shiqāq and al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq 
became the preferred ways for a woman to end the marital relationship, and 
consequently the different forms of fault-based divorce and consensual khul‘ 
almost disappeared from judicial practice (Ministère de la Justice et des Liber-
tés 2012: 8, 15, 18). Similarly, the relative percentage of men requesting a ṭalāq 
divorce dropped significantly as men who wished to divorce began to choose 
shiqāq and al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq in high numbers (Ministère de la Justice et des 
Libertés 2012: 6, 8).
3 The Divorce Reforms in Practice
 Egypt: Is Khul‘ a Solution?
Farafra-Western Desert (Egypt). 21 March 2004. Excerpt from fieldnotes.
Late afternoon. It is still hot in the small oasis town. In the shade of a few 
date palms Hamza, the father of two young children, talks about his 
failed marriage. While his children are playing in the water, he says that 
he does not have official custody of his children and yet he is the one who 
takes care of them. Their mother, his ex-wife, lives far away in Cairo. She 
does not care about her children. She does not care about him. “She cares 
about money and that is why she filed a khul‘ case against me. She could 
never have won the case, because the prompt dower I registered was very 
high. In most cases people only register one pound in the marriage con-
tract. I did not. But my wife knew I would repudiate her instead and pay 
her a lot of money. For the sake of the children, every month I pay 2500 
[Egyptian] pounds in order to cover all of her and the children’s expenses. 
But this is still not enough for her!” He apologises for his outburst, saying 
he does not want to come across as an old man who is complaining. 
“Many women use khul‘ to blackmail their husbands, ‘If you don’t do this, 
I will drag you into court.’ But, it must be said, before the introduction of 
21 The interview took place in a courthouse in the Meknes-Tafilalt legal district (Morocco) 
in March 2015.
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this new [khul‘] law, a woman who wanted to divorce her husband had to 
spend years in court before she could get a divorce, if at all. That was very 
unfair, too.”
Hamza’s story reflects the gender specific attitude to non-consensual khul‘ in 
Egypt. Hamza was from the upper class, but his attitude towards khul‘ was very 
similar to that of men from other class backgrounds. Many men believe that 
women use non-consensual khul‘ for frivolous and selfish reasons, neglecting 
their children and destroying their families in the process. And yet, most men 
also acknowledge that in some cases non-consensual khul‘ provides women a 
quick way out of a dysfunctional marriage (see also Al-Sharmani 2017: 132). By 
contrast, the women with whom I spoke often had very positive views on khul‘ 
(see also Fawzy 2004: 82-3; Al-Sharmani 2017: 134). They usally claim that the 
rationale underlying a khul‘ request was related to a husband’s dysfunctional 
behaviour, very often his unwillingness or inability to provide financial main-
tenance. Why then, would they apply for a divorce in which they had to relin-
quish all their financial rights and pay their husbands a compensation rather 
than file for fault-based divorce?
 Is Khul‘ A Solution for Women?
Unlike Hamza’s ex-wife, the majority of women who request khul‘ are from a 
lower-class background (e.g. Sonneveld 2012; Al-Sharmani 2009, 2017). They 
usually want to divorce because their family has become dysfunctional, for ex-
ample through spousal abuse, (physical and/or mental), non-provision of 
maintenance, unemployment, drug addiction, and/or imprisonment, all of 
which are grounds for a fault-based divorce. In such a divorce, a woman is en-
titled to keep all of her outstanding financial rights and need not return the 
prompt dower. In Egypt, however, fault-based divorce was and still is hard to 
establish. Many cases take two or more years and there is no guarantee that the 
judge will grant the divorce in the end (Tosson 1999). The cases are not only 
time consuming but also costly, especially when a woman must travel great 
distances and miss work to go to court. For a woman whose income depends 
on the number of hours she works, numerous visits to court pose a heavy fi-
nancial burden. What became abundantly clear from my interviews with these 
women is that they had no confidence that establishing grounds for a fault-
based divorce would allow them to collect the deferred dower, waiting-period 
maintenance, and/or mut‘a from their husbands. For these reasons, these 
women argued, if a husband is too poor or simply unwilling to pay mainte-
nance, a no-fault khul‘ divorce is faster and cheaper.
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Although most women in khul‘ cases believe that khul‘ is faster and cheaper, 
both the consensual and non-consensual khul‘ require them to pay compensa-
tion to their husbands. In the law this compensation is called ṣadāq (dower). 
The ṣadāq is not defined by the law, and thus, in the years immediately follow-
ing the implementation of khul‘ in the courts, judges interpreted the ṣadāq in 
different ways. Most judges understood the ṣadāq to be the prompt dower as 
registered in the marriage contract, but in a considerable number of cases 
judges understood the ṣadāq to refer to the deferred dower, and/or the engage-
ment presents, known as qā’ima (’ayma or qayma in Egyptian Arabic) (Al-Shar-
mani 2009; Sonneveld 2012). In practice, this means that some women must 
pay their husbands a deferred dower that they had not yet received, and/or 
engagement presents that were no longer in their possession, usually because 
they had been sold during an economic crisis (Sonneveld 2012; Al-Sharmani 
2017). Following the decisions of higher courts, judges came to the common 
understanding that ṣadāq means prompt dower.22 In every Egyptian marriage 
contract, both the prompt dower and the deferred dower must be registered. 
Because the registrar (ma’dhūn) frequently takes approximately 5 percent of 
the prompt dower, Egyptian marriage contracts usually specify a symbolic 
prompt dower, consisting of one Egyptian pound (roughly ten eurocents) or 
even one-quarter of an Egyptian pound. Since the husband often had regis-
tered only one Egyptian pound as prompt dower in the marriage contract, a 
wife can easily repay this amount, unless her husband objects and asks the 
judge to open an investigation to establish the real amount he had paid. It 
should be noted that the situation for upper-class men, such as Hamza, is dif-
ferent, as I will explain later.
Soon after the introduction of the law, the percentage of women requesting 
a khul‘ divorce was slightly higher than the percentage of women filing for a 
fault-based divorce. For example, in 2001 in Cairo, 2695 women requested khul‘, 
while 2509 women requested taṭlīq. Except for the more conservative gover-
norates in the south of Egypt, the numbers in other governorates were similar. 
In Giza, for example, 1199 and 1125 women requested khul‘ and taṭlīq, respec-
tively. In Alexandria, the numbers were 907 and 825, respectively, and in Sohag 
(South Egypt) 186 and 352. As in Sohag, the number of taṭlīq divorces remained 
higher than the number of khul‘ requests in Egypt south of Cairo (Sulīmān and 
Ṣalāḥ 2003: 18-28). In 2014, the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilisation 
22 In a random selection of ten khul‘ court rulings, issued in February 2016 in a Cairene 
courthouse, the ṣadāq is defined as the amount of prompt dower registered in the mar-
riage contract. If the husband disputes the amount returned to him, he can file a separate 
case.
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and Statistics (CAPMAS) established that the percentage of fault-based cases 
comprised a little over one-third of the total number of khul‘ cases that were 
concluded (Al-Sharmani 2017: 89).
A significant number of women, like Hamza’s ex-wife, cancelled their khul‘ 
lawsuits. For example, in the Northern governerates of Qalyubiya and Gharbi-
ya, of the 72 and 196 khul‘ cases that were filed, 20 and 43 were cancelled, re-
spectively.23 The reasons for the cancellations varied,24 but women frequently 
said that they hoped to pressure husbands into changing their behaviour by 
threatening them with a divorce against their will through khul‘. This usually 
meant that wives wanted their husbands to start paying maintenance (again) 
or that they wanted them to pronounce the ṭalāq. These women took advan-
tage of many a man’s fear that his wife can turn him into a makhlū‘, an issue to 
which I now turn.
 Is Khul‘ A Solution for Men?
As noted by de Hart, Sonneveld and Sportel (2017), the literature on gender and 
legal rights in Muslim-majority countries has overwhelmingly focused on the 
legal rights of Muslim women, usually in the field of divorce. Men are depicted 
as authoritarian, and as having power and privilege over women. This, howev-
er, is not always consistent with how men such as Hamza perceive of the pow-
er balance in marriage. During my fieldwork in both Egypt and Morocco, most 
men with whom I spoke stated that legal reforms in the areas of divorce, cus-
tody, and ruʾyā (visitation) give wives more power over their husbands. Accord-
ing to Al-Sharmani (2017) and Žvan Elliott (2015), who conducted fieldwork 
research in Egypt and Morocco, respectively, men claim that the PSL reforms 
are emasculating them. This explains why some men, such as Hamza, respond 
to their wives’ khul‘ request by pronouncing the ṭalāq. Thinking that divorce is 
the prerogrative of the husband, they prefer to save their honour over divorce 
against their will.
As noted, the introduction of non-consensual khul‘ provoked much contro-
versy in Egypt. In Egyptian society, the term makhlū‘ suggests that the process 
by which a husband is divorced by his wife is like that of a dentist who pulls a 
bad tooth.25 In the first years following the introduction of the divorce reform 
23 This information is based on statistics provided to the author by the Association for the 
Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) in August 2004. Statistics on file with 
author. 
24 Reasons stated included: procedural mistakes and women pressured by relatives to with-
draw their cases. 
25 The term makhlū‘ derives from the verb khala‘a, which means to take off (a garment, a 
tooth).
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in January 2000, cartoons were a very popular way of depicting the disastrous 
effects of khul‘ on men’s honour and masculinity. In the cartoons, we see men 
who are pregnant, pushing babies in strollers, and dominated by their wives 
(see further Sonneveld 2012: Chapter 3).
The stigma attached to a divorce through khul‘ gives women a powerful tool 
for negotiating the terms of the marital relationship. Several women whom 
I interviewed stated that they use khul‘ as a strategy to pressure their husbands 
to change their behaviour and to compel them to pay maintenance. Some 
women go so far as to file a khul‘ case in court, only to cancel it as soon as her 
husband concedes to her wishes, as the interview fragment with Hamza pre-
sented at the beginning of this section makes clear.
Significantly, in the same period, a smaller number of cartoons painted a 
different picture. In Figure 2, we see a husband walking out of the family court. 
Although his wife has divorced him through khul‘, he is neither stigmatised nor 
emasculated. Instead, he emerges triumphant, carrying a sack full of money, 
the ṣadāq, which his wife returned to him as compensation for the divorce and 
which he might use to remarry.
Figure 1
 “The Ruling of the Strongest.” The 
husband says to his wife: “This is not 
a khul‘ ruling, this is the ruling of the 
strong over the weak!” Amr Okasha, 
Al-Wafd, January 31, 2000
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As noted in section 1, an Egyptian husband who wishes to divorce has one legal 
option to do so: ṭalāq. This right of a husband, however, also implies a duty to 
pay his wife maintenance during the waiting period, deferred dower, and at 
least two years of mut‘a compensation, if she is not responsible for the divorce. 
He must also provide suitable housing for her “if they have children.” Because 
a ṭalāq divorce is expensive, it is not unusual for a husband to push his wife 
into a khul‘ so he can divorce her cheaply and use the money to marry another 
woman and pay a new dower. According to Tucker, Ottoman judges were aware 
of this male strategy and tried to verify whether a woman had made the khul‘ 
request of her own free will or had been pressured into it (1999: 99). Similarly, 
in Marinid Morocco, husbands sometimes pressured their wives into khul‘ (Ad-
miral 2016: 127). Under the Moroccan 2004 FL, a woman who can establish that 
she was pressured into requesting a khul‘ is entitled to the return of the com-
pensation payment (Article 117). When I asked three Egyptian judges if they 
were concerned that women might be pressured to ask for khul‘, they acknowl-
edged that husbands sometimes use khul‘ to their advantage, but they stated 
that it is not their duty to make such a determination. Heavy judicial caseloads 
play an important role in the reluctance of judges to investigate whether a 
woman was pressured to make a khul‘ request (Sonneveld 2012: 126-27). In 
some cases, as suggested in the cartoon in Figure 2, the reluctance of a judge to 
Figure 2 “A Husband Walks out of the Personal Status Court.” Amro Selim, Rose al-Yusuf, 
March 13-19, 2004
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investigate whether a wife truly wants khul‘ makes it possible for a husband to 
divorce cheaply, and to demand that his wife return more than the prompt 
dower he had given her.
An Egyptian husband has always had the opportunity to pressure his wife 
into a khul‘ divorce out of court, usually on terms detrimental to her financial 
security and that of her children. The introduction of judicial khul‘ and the le-
gal requirement to return “only” the prompt dower place a limit on excessive 
financial demands by husbands. In some cases, wives involved in khul‘ court 
cases may even walk out of such a marriage by returning the one Egyptian 
pound registered in the marriage contract, when, in fact, the husband had con-
tributed more. The situation for upper class women is different. As the inter-
view with Hamza, the divorced father, makes clear: upper class men do not 
register a symbolic prompt dower. Elite husbands to be (and their families) 
want to display their wealth, and registering a high prompt dower is part of this 
strategy. Consequently, in khul‘ divorce cases, upper-class women usually will 
have to return a higher prompt dower than their lower and middle class coun-
terparts.
In the continuation of our conversation, Hamza told me that the Egyptian 
khul‘ is not Islamic because, if it were, non-consensual khul‘ would be practiced 
in Saudi Arabia. Thus, Hamza concluded, the only reason we have khul‘ in 
Egypt is because some of Suzanne Mubarak’s female friends wanted to get rid 
of their husbands, a view that was widespread in Egypt at the time (Fawzy 
2004; Sonneveld 2012: Chapter 2). One of the main objections to khul‘ in the 
Egyptian public debate is that the procedure is designed for rich elite women 
who can afford to return the ṣadāq (dower). In the authoritarian Egyptian po-
litical context, many males feel that the interests of the powerful few prevail 
over those of the powerless majority, and that the government is interfering in 
the only domain where some men retain their authority: the family.
Between 2000 and 2008, the Egyptian parliament approved a number of ad-
ditional PSL reforms. While the level of public debate never reached that of 
khul‘, the reforms significantly altered the legal position of husbands and wives 
in marriage. In January 2000, a legal reform permitted Egyptian women to trav-
el without the consent of their husbands.26 In 2005, the maternal custody age 
was raised from ten for boys and twelve for girls to fifteen for both boys and 
girls. Above these ages, the law gives the child the right to choose whether to 
26 In November 2000, the Egyptian High Constitutional Court passed a ruling that gives 
Egyptian women the right to request a passport without the need to establish, in writing, 
the agreement of their husbands. Legal professionals interpret this ruling as implicitly 
authorising a wife to travel without the consent of her husband.
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stay with its mother (without custody fees) or father.27 In 2008, a new law gave 
divorced women with custody of children the right to educational guardian-
ship (al-wilāya al-ta‘līmiyya) (i.e. the supervision of children’s choice of school), 
a legal reform that is unparalleled in the Muslim world, except for Tunisia (Ar-
ticle 67 PSL). Based on the claim that the educational guardianship reform vio-
lates the principles of Islamic sharī‘a as enshrined in Article 2 of the Egyptian 
constitution, claimants asked the High Constitutional Court to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the provision in 2010. In March 2016, the High Constitu-
tional Court ruled that the provision on educational guardianship is constitu-
tional.28
When an authoritarian government introduces legislation that enhances 
women’s legal rights with regard to the family but does not reform men’s legal 
rights inside that same family, it is not surprising that when political oppres-
sion is lifted, disenfranchised men will try to abolish the laws that expanded 
their wives’ freedom and curtailed theirs (Sonneveld 2017: 101). After the Egyp-
tian uprising of 25 January 2011, numerous organisations for the rights of 
 divorced fathers gained public prominence. These organisations almost suc-
ceeded in turning back the family law reforms, but in June 2012 Parliament was 
dissolved and their demands were shelved (for more details, see Sonneveld 
and Lindbekk 2015). If anything, the vocal grassroots activism of divorced fa-
thers indicates that a decade of PSL reform in Egypt has had a great impact on 
the position of husbands and fathers inside a (broken) family. Their wives can 
divorce them at will, their children may remain with the mother until at least 
the age of fifteen, and they have lost their position as the educational guard-
ians of their children.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Egyptian men, in particu-
lar, or Middle Eastern men, in general, are or want to be male patriarchs, or, as 
my male interlocutors often call it: “Si Sayyids” – referring to a character in 
Naguib Mahfouz’s trilogy who punished his wife for leaving the house without 
his permission to visit the shrine of a saint. Almost all of the fifty men inter-
viewed by Al-Sharmani in Cairo reported that what they want most in mar-
riage is istiqrār, that is to say, emotional and financial stability with a partner to 
27 In December 2016, there was much online discussion in Egypt about a PSL amendment 
proposed by a female member of parliament, which would transfer custody of children to 
the father in cases in which the mother remarries. For details, see Barlamānī 24 November 
2016, accessed 14 December 2016. Under the current PSL, the mother of the mother is the 
first in line to exercise custody of children when her divorced daughter remarries. A few 
weeks later, the member of parliament denied that her proposal would transfer custody 
of children to the father in case of remarriage of the mother. For details, see Al-Yawm al-
Sābi‘ 8 December 2016, accessed 14 December 2016. 
28 For details, see <http://almogaz.com:8181/news/politics/2016/03/05/2203403>, accessed 
8 March 2016.
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whom they are romantically attached (2017: 155).29 Anthropological studies 
demonstrate that there are different styles of masculinity in the Middle East, 
and that many men are very committed and emotionally involved husbands 
and fathers (Inhorn 2012: 32).
Love and intimacy, however, do not mean that idealised notions of what it 
means to be a man (and a woman) have changed, in particular the notion that 
a husband should be the breadwinner and, in return, his wife must be an obe-
dient housewife and mother. For example, Al-Sharmani found that love and 
attachment manifest themselves within economic and social structures that 
often sustain gender-based inequalities and hierarchies (2017: 116; see also 
Sonneveld 2012: Ghannam 2013; Žvan Elliott 2015). While the fifty Cairene men 
interviewed by Al-Sharmani value istiqrār most in marriage, almost all of them 
regard non-consensual khul‘ as a threat that adds more challenges to existing 
problems of marriage (2017: 130). For example, many husbands find it difficult 
to reconcile social and legal expectations, which define them as independent 
breadwinners and their wives as dependent caretakers, with a reality in which 
these roles are sometimes inversed (Al-Sharmani 2017: 125-30; see also 
Sonneveld 2012). Threatened by this conundrum, Hamza decided to save his 
honour and divorce his wife through what he perceived to be a male preroga-
tive: ṭalāq.
In conclusion, my analysis reveals two important observations concerning 
the way women and men in Egypt divorce in the period following the 2000 
khul‘ divorce reform. First, non-consensual, no-fault khul‘ has become the fa-
vourite means for Egyptian Muslim women to divorce. Second, most men ex-
perience khul‘ as a stigmatising experience, and some prefer to pronounce the 
ṭalāq instead. In the next section, we will see whether the same observations 
hold for Morocco, where, in 2004, women were also given the legal possibility 
to request a non-consensual, no-fault divorce through shiqāq. In contrast to 
Egypt, however, in Morocco both men and women can request shiqāq, with 
men using it in such large numbers that the number of filed ṭalāq cases has 
declined.
 Morocco: Is Shiqāq a Solution?
Fes-Boulemane: Fes (Morocco). 15 April 2015. Excerpt from fieldnotes.
Latif, a man in his forties, is waiting in front of the courtroom. After a 
marriage of fifteen years, his wife decided to invoke shiqāq. Against his 
29 Between 2008 and 2010, Al-Sharmani interviewed fifty men and fifty women in greater 
Cairo who were in different stages of marital relationships. Most of them were from mid-
dle- and low middle-class backgrounds (2017: 112). 
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will. They have two young children. He explains that his wife has a good 
job and since he has always had difficulties finding a steady job, he does 
most of the childrearing and household chores. She is determined to 
divorce him and is willing to renounce all of her financial rights, but – 
and his tone changes – she insists on custody of the children. “Under the 
new law,” Latif says, “the children will remain in her custody until the age 
of fifteen. Fifteen!” In desperation, he continues: “According to the law, I 
have to leave the marital home and rent an apartment. The only legal 
right I have is to see my children a few hours every Sunday. I will miss my 
children a lot.” He starts to cry softly.
 Is Shiqāq a Solution for Women?
Before 2004, a Moroccan woman who wanted a divorce could request either 
taṭlīq or consensual khul‘. As in Egypt, the reformed 2004 FL provided solutions 
for a woman who could not prove cause in court and/or whose husband either 
did not agree to khul‘ or demanded a compensation in return for khul‘ that was 
more than the woman could afford. Article 120 of FL 2004 gives these women 
the right to invoke the irreconcilable differences procedure, shiqāq, in which a 
judge determines the financial rights to be paid by establishing the contribu-
tion of each spouse to the breakdown of the marriage (Article 97 FL 2004).
The judges I interviewed claimed that, initially, women who requested a 
shiqāq dissolution retained their rights to the dower, nafaqa, and mut‘a, unlike 
their Egyptian counterparts, who must renounce these rights. In 2010, the 
Court of Cassation in Rabat issued a ruling declaring that a woman who initi-
ates shiqāq will not receive mut‘a.30 The court reasoned that mut‘a can be 
awarded only in cases in which the husband initiates the ṭalāq or the shiqāq.31 
If a woman requesting shiqāq claims that her husband is the main cause of 
marital strife, she can claim compensation (ta‘wīḍ), and the same applies to a 
husband who claims that his wife is responsible for the marital discord. More-
over, after the wife has initiated the shiqāq divorce, it is her responsibility to 
collect her outstanding rights, such as the deferred dower, from her husband. 
These constraints do not deter women from filing shiqāq cases. In 2011, the 
overwhelming majority of wife-initiated divorce cases nationwide were shiqāq 
30 Several judges (males and females) told me that they approved this ruling because they 
deemed it unfair that women were granted mut‘a compensation in the first years follow-
ing the introduction of shiqāq. Some judges opposed the practice of denying women in 
women-initiated shiqāq case this compensation. See, for example, the elaborate annota-
tion of judge ‘Adil Hamidi, head of the Court of First Instance, Essaouira, on the website 
Maroc Droit (published 15 April 2014, accessed 8 June 2018). 
31 Ruling no. 433, 21 September 2010. 
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cases (22,008),32 followed by al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq (7000),33 khul‘ (4147), and taṭlīq 
li-ghayba (absence) (563) (Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés 2012: 8, 15, 18). 
My analysis of court records from nine courts across the country confirms that 
consensual khul‘, which was the default option for women before the 2004 FL 
reform, and fault-based divorce, are in sharp decline. Almost all divorce cases 
initiated by women are either shiqāq or al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq, which, as noted, dif-
fer from khul‘ in that compensation is not automatically required. In the nine 
courts I visited, of more than 2000 divorce requests made by women in May 
2014, only two were khul‘ divorces. To illustrate, a kātib (clerk) in a courthouse 
in the Fes-Boulemane region said that he had not registered a single khul‘ re-
quest in two years. The procedure, he said, had become extinct (mundarisa).34 
Although most women with whom I spoke requested shiqāq for reasons that 
make them eligible for a fault-based divorce,35 like their Egyptian counter-
parts, they prefer a non-consensual, no-fault divorce procedure because it is 
faster than fault-based divorce. Financially independent women, such as La-
tif ’s wife, do not care much about their financial rights and are prepared to give 
them up completely.
The popularity of women-initiated al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq merits attention. More 
research is needed to find out the most common reasons behind the popular-
ity of this newly introduced option for divorce. My observations in a large pro-
vincial courthouse in the Meknes-Tafilalt legal district clearly showed that 
couples in al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq cases interacted with each other in a number of 
different ways. In some cases, both spouses brought members of their extend-
ed families into the courtroom, while in other cases only one of the spouses 
brought family members while the other spouse (usually the husband) came 
alone. In other cases, both spouses came alone. When in the presence of fam-
ily members of both sides, the spouses usually behaved respectfully to each 
other, but in cases in which the husband came alone and the wife was accom-
panied by family, the relationship was sometimes quite tense. In one case, 
in which both spouses came alone, the husband angrily walked out of the 
32 This number is based on the following calculation. The total number of settled shiqāq 
cases in 2011 was 32,365. Of the total number of shiqāq cases registered in 2011 (settled and 
pending), 68 percent were initiated by women (Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés 
2012: 16, 18). Although it is not clear whether this percentage also applies to the percent-
age of settled shiqāq cases that were initiated by women, I used this percentage to calcu-
late the number of women who actually divorced through shiqāq. 
33 The total number of settled cases in 2011 was 12,209 (Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés 
2012: 6, 8). On the basis of my conversations with family law judges, I estimate that ap-
proximately 60 percent of all al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq cases were initiated by women.
34 Informal conversation with a clerk (kātib kitāba al-ḍabṭ), 23 April 2015.
35 The most common reason is the non-provision of maintenance by the husband. 
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courtroom immediately after the judge had closed his and his wife’s case for 
that day. In all of these instances, spouses probably had different reasons for 
opting for al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq, and it was likely that this “consensual” divorce 
was not always completely consensual. For example, during my fieldwork, 
judges, lawyers and litigants claimed that sometimes a husband makes his de-
mands reasonable, so as to prevent his wife from resorting to a more expensive 
and stigmatising shiqāq divorce against his will. In these cases, the introduc-
tion of shiqāq has given women a powerful tool to negotiate the terms of mar-
riage dissolution. In most cases, however, my interlocutors claimed that 
spouses wish to end the relationship on amicable terms to avoid the stigma 
that may arise from a contested divorce, for their own sake but also for the sake 
of the children, or to maintain good relations with the ex-partner’s inlaws, es-
pecially when the spouses belong to the same extended family.
 Men Divorced Against Their Will
In the interview excerpt presented earlier, Latif, the divorced father, was di-
vorced against his will through shiqāq. The divorce had several consequences. 
First, by law Latif was required to pay his wife her deferred dower and the wait-
ing-period maintenance, and, second, he had to give up custody of his chil-
dren. During the interview with me inside the courthouse, Latif did not talk 
much about the financial consequences of the divorce, despite the fact that he 
had difficulties in securing a steady stream of income. His indifference was 
probably related to the fact that his wife, who was the main breadwinner, was 
prepared to renounce her right to the deferred dower and waiting-period 
maintenance. The extent to which this practice is common is not clear to me. 
Given that most women prefer a speedy shiqāq, there is reason to expect that 
wives with fewer economic resources would prefer to renounce their outstand-
ing financial rights rather than spend much time on collecting them, some-
thing which, judges admit, can be hard. Further research is needed to determine 
whether these women attempt to establish grounds retroactively in order to 
receive compensation from their ex-husbands. As noted earlier, this was com-
mon practice in khul‘ cases in Marinid Morocco (Admiral 2016: 124).
Second, Latif was moved to tears by the prospect of losing the right to be 
intimately involved in the care and upbringing of his young children. During 
their marriage, his wife had held a well-paid job while he had assumed respon-
sibility of most of the childcare and household chores. According to the 1993 
Moroccan PSL, it was a husband’s duty to provide maintenance for his wife and 
children and for a wife to be an obedient mother and housewife. Although this 
provision was amended in 2004, giving husbands and wives equal responsibil-
ity for the supervision of the family (Article 4 FL 2004), this does not mean that 
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households such as Latif ’s, in which the wife works outside the home and the 
husband inside the home, are common. And yet, they are not an exception. 
The variation in the division of labour in Moroccan households is not reflected 
in the 2004 PSL reform. In the event of divorce, custody is no longer the duty 
of both parents (Article 164 FL 2004), but passes to the mother, with the father 
second in line (Article 171 FL 2004).
In general, it is hard for a father to gain legal custody of his children.36 In a 
courthouse in the Middle Atlas Mountains, my research assistant and I met 
with a father who had filed a lawsuit demanding custody of his teenage daugh-
ter. The girl’s biological mother was a prostitute with whom her father had had 
a sexual relationship. After a DNA test proved that he was the biological father, 
he acknowledged the girl in court and took care of her, both financially and 
emotionally. He did not object to the girl’s living with her mother, until he 
learned that the mother was training the girl to become a prostitute too. Over 
the course of a few months, we witnessed how he tried to gain custody of his 
daughter and bring her into his household, to no avail.
Apart from cases where fathers try to gain custody of their children, there 
are also divorced Egyptian and Moroccan fathers who were confronted with 
custody of their children against their will. Men like Hamza feel that they have 
no choice but to shoulder the daily responsibility of childcare tasks in the face 
of mothers for whom child custody is more of a burdensome duty than a right. 
In most cases, divorced mothers claim they lack the financial resources to care 
for their children’s daily needs and they think that the children will be better 
off with their fathers (see also Vatuk, this volume). In the Egyptian oasis, sur-
rounded by his children, Hamza accused his ex-wife not only of neglecting 
their offspring, but also of being greedy. Despite the fact that he was the actual 
caregiver for their children, he had to pay her large sums of child maintenance 
every month because she had legal custody of them.
The stories of the Moroccan and Egyptian fathers presented in this essay do 
not necessarily mean that perceptions regarding the gendered nature of the 
spousal roles are changing. In her research in Cairo, Al-Sharmani noted that 
the majority of the fifty men and fifty women that she interviewed still regard 
childcare (and housework) as the main responsibility of the wife (2017: 130), 
despite the fact that many of these women work outside the home. The stories 
presented here point to an empirical reality that has been largely ignored, both 
by academics and by legislators. In both countries, legislators introduced legal 
reforms that make it easier to divorce, without introducing custody reforms 
36 If the mother custodian remarries, custody of children older than seven years of age pass-
es to the father (Articles 174 and 175 FL 2004). 
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that reflect the multifaceted types of post-divorce childcare arrangements in 
Moroccan and Egyptian society.
 Is Male-Initiated Shiqāq a Solution for Men?
Whereas in Egypt, non-consensual, no-fault divorce reform is open only to 
women, in Morocco it is open to both men and women. The introduction of 
shiqāq and al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq changed the divorce patterns and strategies of 
both Moroccan women and men. In 2011, approximately 32 percent of the 
32365 shiqāq cases (10357) and approximately 40 percent of the 12209 al-ṭalāq 
bi’l-ittifāq (5000) cases were raised by husbands.37 By comparison, the number 
of ṭalāq divorces was 2310 (Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés 2012: 6, 8). 
Interviews with judges reveal that husbands favour shiqāq over ṭalāq for two 
reasons. First, ṭalāq requires a husband to deposit the deferred dower, waiting-
period maintenance, and mut‘a in the courthouse safe within a period not ex-
ceeding thirty days from the date of the final attempt at mediation (Article 83 
FL 2004). A judge will authorise a husband to register the repudiation only af-
ter he has paid the deposit (Article 87 FL 2004). By contrast, in husband-initi-
ated shiqāq cases, the divorce is not conditional on the husband’s first 
depositing the amount due to the wife. If, for whatever reason, a husband fails 
to deposit the required sum of money, the wife must collect the money owed 
by returning to court. However, judges claim that this practice in shiqāq cases 
came to an end after husbands were required to pay their financial obligations 
to the court before receiving judicial authorisation to register the divorce.
Even after this judicial intervention, husbands continued to file for shiqāq 
rather than for ṭalāq. In a ṭalāq case, the husband must wait for the ‘idda period 
to end before the divorce becomes final, while in a shiqāq case the divorce oc-
curs immediately and is irrevocable (Article 123 FL 2004). A male-initiated 
shiqāq is also cheaper than ṭalāq as a husband does not pay his wife mut‘a. Ac-
cording to the judges I interviewed, Moroccan men, like women, prefer to sep-
arate on amicable terms through al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq, and, when this proves 
difficult, they want to divorce as cheaply and quickly as possible through 
shiqāq.
37 Between 30-35 percent of the requests for shiqāq are made by husbands. This percentage 
is based on statistics provided by the Moroccan Ministry of Justice and Liberties. The 
statistics show that, in 2010, 34 percent of requests for shiqāq were made by husbands. In 
2011, this number fell to 32 percent (Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés 2012: 18). On 
al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq, see the calculation in footnote 33.
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 Conclusion
Over the last two decades, legislators and ruling elites in many Arab states have 
tried to bring women’s rights to divorce in line with those of men through the 
introduction of no-fault divorce at the demand of the wife. Egypt and Moroc-
co, which introduced khul‘ and shiqāq in 2000 and 2004, respectively, were pio-
neers in this regard. In this essay, I compared the rights and duties of both men 
and women with regard to divorce in Egypt and Morocco. I posed two ques-
tions: First, how do men and women navigate the different pathways to divorce 
and, second, are there differences between the two countries in the way they 
try to obtain a divorce?
In Egypt, many opponents to the khul‘ divorce reform claimed that it would 
only be an option for rich women who could afford to renounce their outstand-
ing rights and return the dower. In practice, however, non-consensual, no-fault 
divorce usually has little economic cost for women in Egypt. The same applies 
to women in Morocco. Even though Egyptian and Moroccan women must give 
up (some of) their financial rights and must (sometimes) compensate their 
husbands, the financial and mental costs of prolonged litigation, with no guar-
antee that a divorce will be obtained in the end, make khul‘ and shiqāq the 
most common way for women to end their marriages.
The introduction of the Moroccan non-consensual, no-fault shiqāq divorce 
has reduced the relative and absolute number of Moroccan husbands who re-
quest a ṭalāq divorce. When opportunities for divorce increase for both men 
and women, as happened in Morocco, both spouses prefer to separate either 
on amicable terms (al-ṭalāq bi’l-ittifāq) or to divorce as quickly and cheaply as 
possible through a procedure that leads to a fast, guaranteed, and irrevocable 
result. In Egypt, however, only women have been given increased opportuni-
ties for divorce. The lack of increased divorce opportunities for Egyptian hus-
bands may account for the emergence in the mid-2000s of organisations for 
the rights of divorced fathers. The main aims of these small but vocal organisa-
tions are to change khul‘ from a non-consensual to a consensual procedure, 
and to give fathers more legal rights to see their children.
The impact of family law reform on husbands and fathers has largely es-
caped the attention of scholars working on gender in the Middle East, de-
spite the growing number of ethnographic studies of courts. In this essay I 
have argued that gender should no longer be analysed exclusively in terms of 
women’s interests. A full gender analysis will make it possible to gain a more 
detailed understanding of the impact of legal reform on the lives of both men 
and women. According to Charrad, the core mandate of scholarship on gen-
der in the Middle East is “to dismantle the stereotype of the silent, passive, 
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subordinate, victimized, and powerless Muslim woman” (2011: 418). The time 
has now come for scholars to challenge the stereotype of the controlling, domi-
nant, and oppressive Arab man and to demonstrate that husbands and fathers 
have a wide range of relationships with their wives and children. Hamza and 
Latif, the Egyptian and Moroccan fathers discussed in the two case studies, 
bore the main responsibility for childrearing and nurturing. This aspect of dai-
ly life is not reflected in current Egyptian and Moroccan personal status law. 
For these men, divorce can come at a high price.
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